Securing Distance Vector Routing Protocols for Hybrid Wireless Mish Networks
Hybrid Wireless Mesh Networks (HWMNs) are currently emerging as a promising technology for a wide range of applications such as public safety, emergency response, and disaster recovery operations. HWMNs combine the concepts of mesh networks and ad hoc networks to maintain network connectivity. Routing is essential for HWMN in order to discover the network topology and built routes. The problem of all the current ad hoc routing protocols is that they trust all nodes and assume that they behave properly; therefore they are more vulnerable to nodes misbehavior. Misbehaving nodes can advertise incorrect routing information and disturb the topology building process. This attack is difficult to detect in distance vector routing protocols since nodes have no information regarding the network topology beyond the immediate neighbors. In this paper we propose a Consistency Check protocol for Distance Vector routing in HWMN environment. Our Consistency Check protocol can detect and reject false routes under the assumption that some mesh routers are trusted and do not cheat. Trough security analysis and simulation, we show that our approach is resilient to false accusation attacks while inducing an acceptable routing overhead.
Security, Routing, Hybrid Wireless Mesh Networks